False-Belief Representation and Attribution in Preschoolers: Testing a Graded-Representation hypothesis

On attribue généralement les difficultés des jeunes enfants à la tâche de la fausse croyance à un défaut de représentation. Cependant, la version standard de l’épreuve ne permet pas de distinguer les capacités de représentation et d’attribution d’une fausse croyance. Afin de mieux apprécier chacune de ces capacités, on a proposé à 114 enfants de 3 et 4 ans deux nouvelles versions ou la version standard de l’épreuve. Dans une première variante, on a introduit un second personnage dont le point de vue correspondait à celui des participants afin de conférer des statuts similaires aux deux points de vue en jeux dans la tâche, et ainsi d’aider à la compréhension que différentes croyances à propos d’une même réalité peuvent co-exister. Dans une seconde variante, l’introduction du second personnage était accompagnée d’étiquettes afin de favoriser l’attribution correcte des croyances. Ces nouvelles versions ont effectivement été mieux réussies que la standard. En outre, certains enfants ont attribué une vraie et une fausse croyances mais ont inversé les personnages, laissant apparaître un éventuel niveau intermédiaire de connaissance. Les résultats sont discutés en référence au modèle des représentations graduées de Munakata (2001).Preschoolers’difficulty in the false-belief task has generally been attributed to a deficit in false-belief representations. However, the standard version of the task does not allow one to distinguish between the ability to represent and the ability to attribute false beliefs. In order to disentangle these two abilities, 114 3- and 4-year-olds were tested on one of two modified versions of the task or on the standard version. In the first modified version, an additional character whose perspective matched that of the participants was introduced in order to give similar statuses to the two perspectives at stake; this was designed to help children understand that different beliefs about a given reality can coexist. In a second modified version, the introduction of the second character was accompanied by stickers used as memory cues for correct belief attributions. As expected, the modified versions turned out to be easier than the standard one. Moreover, some children attributed both true and false beliefs but reversed them, which may reflect an intermediate level of knowledge. The results are discussed in terms of Munakata’s (2001) graded-representation model

Inhibiting errors while they are produced: direct evidence for error monitoring and inhibitory control in children

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Respective contributions of inhibition and knowledge levels in class inclusion development: a negative priming study

International audienceDempster (Dempster, 1995; Dempster & Corkill, 1999) proposed that developmental changes in performance on Piagetian tasks could be related to changes in inhibitory efficiency more than to logical development. In this study, the negative priming paradigm was adapted to the class inclusion task in order to investigate the role of inhibition and knowledge levels in the development of class inclusion. Participants were pre-tested on two inclusion tasks, the standard Piagetian task and Markman's modification task, and assigned to different knowledge levels: empirical, and logical necessity. Children were then tested on a priming version of the class inclusion task. Results showed a negative priming effect, indicating that the irrelevant 'subclass comparison strategy' was actively inhibited during the processing of the class inclusion task. This effect was found to vary as a function of knowledge levels, indicating that the need for inhibition was reduced when children had attained logical necessity

False-Belief Representation and Attribution in Preschoolers: Testing a Graded-Representation hypothesis

On attribue généralement les difficultés des jeunes enfants à la tâche de la fausse croyance à un défaut de représentation. Cependant, la version standard de l’épreuve ne permet pas de distinguer les capacités de représentation et d’attribution d’une fausse croyance. Afin de mieux apprécier chacune de ces capacités, on a proposé à 114 enfants de 3 et 4 ans deux nouvelles versions ou la version standard de l’épreuve. Dans une première variante, on a introduit un second personnage dont le point de vue correspondait à celui des participants afin de conférer des statuts similaires aux deux points de vue en jeux dans la tâche, et ainsi d’aider à la compréhension que différentes croyances à propos d’une même réalité peuvent co-exister. Dans une seconde variante, l’introduction du second personnage était accompagnée d’étiquettes afin de favoriser l’attribution correcte des croyances. Ces nouvelles versions ont effectivement été mieux réussies que la standard. En outre, certains enfants ont attribué une vraie et une fausse croyances mais ont inversé les personnages, laissant apparaître un éventuel niveau intermédiaire de connaissance. Les résultats sont discutés en référence au modèle des représentations graduées de Munakata (2001).Preschoolers’difficulty in the false-belief task has generally been attributed to a deficit in false-belief representations. However, the standard version of the task does not allow one to distinguish between the ability to represent and the ability to attribute false beliefs. In order to disentangle these two abilities, 114 3- and 4-year-olds were tested on one of two modified versions of the task or on the standard version. In the first modified version, an additional character whose perspective matched that of the participants was introduced in order to give similar statuses to the two perspectives at stake; this was designed to help children understand that different beliefs about a given reality can coexist. In a second modified version, the introduction of the second character was accompanied by stickers used as memory cues for correct belief attributions. As expected, the modified versions turned out to be easier than the standard one. Moreover, some children attributed both true and false beliefs but reversed them, which may reflect an intermediate level of knowledge. The results are discussed in terms of Munakata’s (2001) graded-representation model

The evolution of research on collaborative learning

For many years, theories of collaborative learning tended to focus on how individuals function in a group. More recently, the focus has shifted so that the group itself has become the unit of analysis. In terms of empirical research, the initial goal was to establish whether and under what circumstances collaborative learning was more effective than learning alone. Researchers controlled several independent variables (size of the group, composition of the group, nature of the task, communication media, and so on). However, these variables interacted with one another in a way that made it almost impossible to establish causal links between the conditions and the effects of collaboration. Hence, empirical studies have more recently started to focus less on establishing parameters for effective collaboration and more on trying to understand the role which such variables play in mediating interaction. In this chapter, we argue that this shift to a more process-oriented account requires new tools for analysing and modelling interactions

Categorical flexibility in children: Distinguishing response flexibility from conceptual flexibility: The protracted development of taxonomic representations

26 pagesThis research explored the development of children's use of multiple conceptual organizations (thematic, taxonomic) in sorting sets of pictures. Experiment 1 revealed that between 5 and 9 years, two forms of categorical flexibility can be distinguished: Response and conceptual flexibility. It appeared that children's multiple sorts do not necessarily reflect the use of different conceptual organizations. Such lag was mainly due to a difficulty of access to taxonomic representations, specifically in the younger age groups. Therefore, Experiment 2 investigated the development of taxonomic representations using an original approach requiring participants to decide whether new items could be included into an existing taxonomic sort. This approach showed that taxonomic representations were only gradually differentiated from thematic- and perceptual ones over the 5 to 10 years period. The discussion raises new hypotheses about the interaction between developing executive control (specifically, increasing resistance to interference of irrelevant information) and increasing conceptual knowledge in accounting for the development of conceptual flexibility

BD2I : Normes sur l'identification de 274 images d'objets et leur mise en relation chez l'enfant français de 3 à 8 ans

The data base BD2I provides the first French norms for children of 274 pictures of objects (150 from Snodgarss and Vanderwart, 1980). Correct picture identification and naming, and identification of taxonomic and thematic associations were evaluated between 3 and 8 years. Verbal justification and strength of the associations were assessed between 4 and 8 years. All norms were collected from 80 children by age. Visual similarity was judged by 40 adults. These normative data are necessary because children are less efficient than adults in naming and also because their representations of objects relations differ from those of adults

Contrôle cognitif

Le programme de recherche DOPCONTROL soutenu par l'ANR a pour ambition de décrire les trajectoires développementales des différents processus sous-tendant le contrôle cognitif sur un large empan d'âge (de 5 ans à l'adolescence et chez de jeunes adultes). Ce projet interdisciplinaire s'appuie sur une approche comportementale expérimentale et des mesures neurophysiologiques